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Is There a Georgia Supreme Court,
Problem? Analyzing the Georgia
Supreme Court’s New Peculiar
Approach Towards Breathalyzers
and Implied Consent Law*
I. INTRODUCTION
Alcohol and criminal behavior often accompany each other as anyone
with any experience with the justice system (or intoxicated people in
general) can attest to. A significant percentage of the population would
probably say their worst decisions and mistakes came about while
under the influence of booze or other intoxicants, and crime statistics
would back this up.1 Alcohol-related crime statistics in the United
States compiled by AlcoRehab show around 500,000 cases of alcohol
related violence every year and also demonstrate that an incredible 86%
of homicides and 60% of sexual abuse or rape cases were committed
under the influence of alcohol.2
Because of the common presence of alcohol in crime, for a great
number of criminal prosecutions and civil lawsuits, a significant factor
for the trier of fact to determine is whether the defendant was
intoxicated or under the influence of alcohol at the time of his alleged
crime or misdeed. In most states, law enforcement has sought to
determine the amount of alcohol in a person’s system through various

*To my parents, Michelle Collins and Brian Fussell, for their support and love
throughout my law school career. I would also like to thank Professor Gerwig-Moore for
advising me on both of my law review papers these last two years. Finally, I would like to
thank all my friends, colleagues, and professors at Mercer Law School for the best three
years of law school I could have hoped for.
1. See Brian Obodeze, Alcohol and Crime: Does the Popular Drug Influence Offence
Levels?, ALCOREHAB, https://alcorehab.org/the-effects-of-alcohol/alcohol-related-crimes/
(last visited Nov. 16, 2019).
2. Id.
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tests of the person’s breath, blood, or urine. 3 In many jurisdictions, the
purpose of such tests is to ascertain the ratio of alcohol to blood in a
person’s body because certain presumptions as to intoxication arise
from certain alcohol to blood ratios. Although both blood and urine
samples may be tested in order to determine the presence of alcohol in
the blood of a suspect, and such tests are in fact conducted on occasion
by the police, the use of air (or breath) samples has developed as the
most common method of determining the amount of alcohol in a
person’s system.4 Breath tests are prevalent because they are less
obstructive and unobtrusive when compared to other methods, and
provide for immediate results. A person, simply by blowing or breathing
into certain equipment, can provide a sample of the air in his body.
Then an analysis of the air can be made and the findings can be
correlated to an alcohol to blood ratio. 5
One of the most common alcohol-related offenses is driving under the
influence (DUI). Two recent decisions handed down by the Supreme
Court of the United States and the Georgia Supreme Court covered the
same area of law concerning constitutional rights and the scourge of
drunk driving, and, not for the first time, the two courts came to
opposite conclusions. What may surprise some scholars unfamiliar with
DUI laws in Georgia is that the Georgia Supreme Court actually
expanded constitutional protections concerning criminal rights while
the Supreme Court of the United States did not. 6 The constitutional
right in question is the ancient and often thorny right governing
self-incrimination by criminal defendants, memorialized in the Fifth
Amendment to the United States Constitution 7 and Article 1, Section 1,
Paragraph XVI of the Georgia Constitution.8
3. See, e.g., Brown v. State, 893 So. 2d 1274, 1277 (Ala. Crim. App. 2004) (holding
that under Alabama law defendant had consented to having a sample of his blood taken
for the purpose of determining the alcohol content in body); State v. Bodden, 877 So. 2d
680, 689 (Fla. 2004) (stating that urine testing was less intrusive than blood testing and
less complex than breath testing); Birchfield v. North Dakota, 136 S. Ct. 2160, 2165
(2016) (stating that “breath tests are significantly less intrusive than blood tests and in
most cases amply serve law enforcement interests.”).
4. Three
Types
of
BAC
Testing,
BACTRACK.COM,
https://www.bactrack.com/blogs/expert-center/35043461-three-types-of-bac-testing
(last
visited Nov. 16, 2019).
5. Id.
6. See Elliott v. State, 305 Ga. 179, 824 S.E.2d 265 (2019); Mitchell v. Wisconsin,
139 S. Ct. 2525 (2019).
7. U.S. CONST. amend. V. “No person . . . shall be compelled in any criminal case to
be a witness against himself.” Id.
8. GA. CONST. art. 1, § 1, para. XVI. “No person shall be compelled to give testimony
tending in any manner to be self-incriminating.” Id.
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In Elliott v. State,9 the Georgia Supreme Court held that the
admission of evidence consisting of a suspect’s refusal to take a
breathalyzer test while under the suspicion of driving under the
influence violated the state constitution’s prohibition against
self-incrimination.10 The court in Elliott also further expanded the
court’s controversial ruling in Olevik v. State,11 in which the court held
that the right against self-incrimination applied to compelled breath
tests and that a suspect’s right to refuse such a test was a constitutional
right. The decision in Olevik overruled decades of previous Georgia case
law.12 Conversely, in Mitchell v. Wisconsin,13 the Supreme Court of the
United States upheld its previous rulings regarding this matter, stating
that compelled blood alcohol content (BAC) tests do not violate a
defendant’s right against self-incrimination, and that a defendant’s
refusal to submit to a BAC test can be used as evidence against the
defendant at trial.14
This Comment will compare and analyze Georgia law, federal law,
and the law of other jurisdictions concerning their approaches to the
admission of BAC tests and how such admissions relate to
constitutional rights. This Comment will also consider what effect, if
any, this type of law has on DUI statistics, crash statistics, and criminal
prosecutions relating to alcohol. This Comment will also address the
practicality of the Georgia ruling as it relates to the citizens of Georgia
and the ability of law enforcement to enforce the laws of the state. The
Comment will show that the Georgia Supreme Court’s ruling in Elliott
is markedly different than the majority of other states and the federal
judiciary. The reasoning behind the rule, as well as the rule itself, is of
new development in the state, though the court went back to common
law over a century old to reach its conclusion. This Comment will also
argue that the court’s attempt to consolidate the realities of the present
with the constitutions of the past serve primarily to confuse Georgia’s
citizens, frustrate its law enforcement, and fascinate its lawyers.
II. A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE RIGHT AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION
Upon the passage of the Bill of Rights and the adoption of the Fifth
Amendment, for roughly 175 years the federal protections associated

9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.

305 Ga. 179, 824 S.E.2d 265 (2019).
Id. at 179–80, 824 S.E.2d at 267.
302 Ga. 228, 806 S.E.2d 505 (2017).
Id. at 246, 806 S.E.2d at 520.
139 S. Ct. 2525 (2019).
Id. at 2533.
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with self-incrimination were restricted to federal courts.15 States were
left to come up with their own laws. 16 However, in 1964 the Supreme
Court of the United States held that this privilege found in federal law
was applicable to the states by way of the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.17 Two years later, in the seminal case
Schmerber v. California,18 the Court analyzed and limited the scope of
the privilege. Schmerber, the defendant, was arrested for drunk
driving, and his blood was drawn by a physician at the direction of a
police officer. Analysis of the blood sample revealed an illegal level of
intoxication, and the results of the test were admitted into evidence at
trial.19 On appeal, the Court differentiated between compelling a
suspect to produce physical evidence and giving testimony, finding the
former to be allowable and coerced testimony to be unconstitutional. 20
While at the time of Schmerber the majority of states limited the
privilege to testimonial compulsion, a few jurisdictions extended the
sweep of the self-incrimination protection to nontestimonial evidence.21
Georgia provides one example. In Aldrich v. State,22 a suspect accused
of driving a truck over a statutorily mandated weight level was
convicted because he refused to drive onto a scale. On appeal, he argued
that this compulsion violated his right against self-incrimination.23 The
Georgia Supreme Court ruled that this compulsion violated his
constitutional right against self-incrimination, and has consistently
15. See Barron v. City of Baltimore, 32 U.S. 243, 246 (1833).
16. See Ferguson v. State of Georgia, 365 U.S. 570, 570 (1961). The Supreme Court of
the United States noted with incredulity that Georgia was “apparently the only
jurisdiction in the common-law world—to retain the common-law rule that a person
charged with a criminal offense is incompetent to testify under oath in his own behalf at
his trial.” Id.
17. Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 3 (1964); U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
18. 384 U.S. 757 (1966).
19. Id. at 758–59.
20. Id. at 765. “[F]ederal and state courts have usually held that [the privilege to
refuse] offers no protection against compulsion to submit to fingerprinting,
photographing, or measurements, to write or speak for identification, to appear in court,
to stand, to assume a stance, to walk, or to make a particular gesture.” Id. at 764.
21. See Davis v. State, 31 So. 569, 571 (Ala. 1902).
The statement of witness Goldsmith that defendant declined to consent to his
taking away the shoes which he (defendant) was wearing for the purpose of
comparison with certain tracks supposed to have been made by defendant
should have been excluded. This testimony was clearly illegal upon the
principle that the accused cannot be compelled to do or say anything that may
tend to criminate him . . . .
Id.
22. 220 Ga. 132, 137 S.E.2d 463 (1964).
23. Id. at 133, 137 S.E.2d at 464.
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held since then that self-incrimination will also apply to compelled acts
and compelled testimony.24
III. BREATHALYZERS, REFUSALS, AND WHETHER THEY CAN BE ADMITTED
INTO EVIDENCE: A SURVEY OF NOTABLE JURISDICTIONS
A.

The Peach State

Georgia’s long history of self-incrimination law mark it as a clear
outlier among the other jurisdictions in the country. Indeed, Georgia
prohibited defendants from testifying under oath at their own trial until
1962, while every other state had given defendants the right to testify
by the end of the nineteenth century. 25 The setting of the decision in
Elliott occurred, like many gripping stories involving alcohol and local
law enforcement, in Clarke County, Georgia.26 Andrea Elliott was
stopped by a local police officer after she was observed committing
several traffic violations in August of 2015. 27 Elliott admitted that she
had been drinking earlier, and after the usual gamut of sobriety tests, 28
the officer arrested her. The officer then read the statutorily-mandated
implied consent notice, which among other things stated that an
individual’s refusal to submit to a state-administered breath test might
be offered as evidence of her guilt at trial. 29 Elliott later filed a motion
24. Id. at 132, 134, 137 S.E.2d at 463, 464. For other articles looking at the history of
self-incrimination and DUI laws, see Kasey Youngentob, Comment, Changing Lanes: The
Criminalization of Refusal in DUI Laws, 70 VAND. L. REV. EN BANC 121 (2017); Ronald L.
Carlson & Michael S. Carlson, Unconstitutionality and the Rule of Wide-Open
Cross-Examination: Encroaching on the Fifth Amendment When Examining the Accused,
7 J. MARSHALL L. J. 269 (2014); Mariah Haffield, Comment, Is Warrantless Urine Testing
Constitutional?—Reasonableness of Warrantless Urine Testing in Cases Involving Driving
While Under the Influence of Alcohol of Drugs, 97 NEB. L. REV. 860 (2019).
25. Elliott, 305 Ga. at 214, 824 S.E.2d at 289–90.
26. Clarke County is the location of the University of Georgia and is well known for
its bar scene and college atmosphere. According to the website Blacksheeponline, Athens,
the county seat of Clarke County, leads the nation in bars per square mile with over 97
bars in total and 127 places with a liquor license. Anna Hopkins, A Definitive Guide to
Athens
Bar
Hopping,
THEBLACKSHEEPONLINE
(Sept.
8,
2015),
https://theblacksheeponline.com/booze/a-definitive-guide-to-athens-bar-hopping.
27. Elliott, 305 Ga. at 180–81, 824 S.E.2d at 268. Specifically, Elliott failed to
maintain her lane. Id. at 181, 824 S.E.2d at 268.
28. The officer observed several signs of impairment while administering the tests,
including several obvious tells while Elliott was performing a field sobriety test. The
officer also reported that he smelt alcohol during the scene. Id. at 181, 824 S.E.2d at 268.
29. Id. The pertinent language of the then implied consent notice stated:
Georgia law requires you to submit to state administered chemical tests of your
blood, breath, urine, or other bodily substances for the purpose of determining
if you are under the influence of alcohol or drugs. If you refuse this testing,
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to suppress the breath test at trial, arguing that the introduction of
such evidence would violate her rights involving self-incrimination
under the Georgia Constitution. The trial court denied this motion, 30
while the Georgia Supreme Court overruled the trial court.31
The Georgia Supreme Court based its decision on its previous ruling
in Olevik and its interpretation of the Georgia Constitution. 32 The court
explained that it interprets the Georgia Constitution based on the
original public meaning of the constitutional provision at the time the
constitution was ratified, the latest being the 1983 Georgia
Constitution.33 Paragraph XVI bars self-incrimination by criminal
defendants and was first ratified in the Georgia Constitution of 1877. 34
The Supreme Court of Georgia ruled in Olevik that the incrimination
clause applies to both incriminating acts as well as testimony, based on
the presumption of constitutional continuity, the rulings of two Georgia
Supreme Court cases around the same time, and the fact that the
clause has not changed since 1887. Therefore, a citizen could not be
forced to submit to a breathalyzer test. 35 The court’s ruling in Olevik on
the issue overruled decades of previous Georgia case law. 36
In Elliott, the court upheld the Olevik decision, ruling that the
refusal to consent to a breath test fell within Paragraph XVI, but it
answered separately on whether the admission of that refusal at trial

your . . . refusal to submit to the required testing may be offered into evidence
against you at trial.
O.C.G.A. § 40-5-67.1(b)(2) (2018), declared unconstitutional by Elliott v. State, 305 Ga.
179, 824 S.E.2d 265 (2019).
30. Elliott, 305 Ga. at 181, 824 S.E.2d at 268.
31. Id. at 180–81, 824 S.E.2d at 267.
32. Id. at 180, 824 S.E.2d at 267–68.
33. Id. at 181, 824 S.E.2d at 268. Unlike the United States, Georgia has had ten
constitutions since the colonies first declared independence from Great Britain. Id. at 182,
824 S.E.2d at 268.
34. Id. at 182, 824 S.E.2d at 269.
35. Olevik, 302 Ga. at 239–41, 806 S.E.2d at 515–18. In Olevik the court considered
two cases from this time period in order to determine the meaning of Paragraph XVI at
that time and concluded based on the cases that the provision applied to incriminating
acts. See Day v. State, 63 Ga. 668, 669 (1879); Calhoun v. State, 144 Ga. 679, 680–81, 87
S.E. 893, 894 (1916).
36. See Sauls v. State, 293 Ga. 165, 167, 744 S.E.2d 735, 737 (2013) (stating “this
Court has readily acknowledged that to be permitted to refuse to submit to chemical
testing is not a right of constitutional magnitude . . . .”); see also Cooper v. State, 277 Ga.
282, 290, 587 S.E.2d 605, 611 (2003) (stating “[t]his Court has made plain that the
Georgia Constitution does not protect citizens from compelled blood or breath testing or
from the use of the results of the compelled testing during trial.”); Klink v. State, 272 Ga.
605, 606, 533 S.E.2d 92, 94 (2000).

[20] COMMENT - FUSSELL BP (DO NOT DELETE)

2019]

BREATHALYZERS

11/26/2019 11:31 AM

399

violated the Georgia Constitution.37 The court first examined the 1877
provision, reasoning that when considered in isolation, it did not clearly
preclude admission of evidence that a defendant refused a blood test. 38
Therefore, the court considered pre-Revolution common law and
subsequent developments of the common law for the proper context of
the 1877 provision.39 While the court’s survey revealed that the preRevolution common law right did not forbid admissions of a defendant’s
refusal to self-incriminate, the court ultimately concluded, based on the
development of the common law by the end of the nineteenth century,
that the 1877 provision prohibited admission of a defendant’s invocation
of his privilege against self-incrimination.40 Finding no subsequent
developments in the last 132 years altering the original meaning of the
1887 provision, and dismissing the persuasive authority of the Supreme
Court of the United States, the court concluded that admission of
evidence of Elliott’s refusal violated the state’s constitutional protection
against self-incrimination.41
While the Georgia Supreme Court’s analysis in Elliott was extensive
and covered several centuries of the law, Georgia lawyers may
undoubtedly become confused if one were to research the issue more
thoroughly. Georgia courts have come to several different conclusions
over the years regarding the admissibility of breath test refusals, and
this new position is a recent development.42
37. Elliott, 305 Ga. at 209, 824 S.E.2d at 287.
38. Id. at 211–12, 824 S.E.2d at 288.
39. Id. at 212, 824 S.E.2d at 288 (citing Virginia v. Moore, 553 U.S. 164, 168 (2008)).
40. Elliott, 305 Ga. at 217–18, 824 S.E.2d at 291–92. The Georgia Supreme Court
pointed out several cases decided around the same time of the 1877 constitutional
convention which indicate this notion: Bird v. State, 50 Ga. 585, 589 (1874) (overturning
the conviction of a defendant where the court instructed the jury that it may take into
consideration the defendant’s failure to make a statement in his own defense);
Loewenherz v. Merchants and Mechanics Bank of Columbus, 144 Ga. 556, 559, 87 S.E.
778 (1916) (stating that “[w]hen the claimant in this case declined to answer the
question[s] set forth above, he was merely claiming and availing himself of the privilege
guaranteed in the clause of the constitution quoted”). Id.
41. Elliott, 305 Ga. at 223, 824 S.E.2d at 296. As a result of this conclusion, the court
struck down both O.C.G.A. §§ 40-5-67.1(b) and 40-6-392 to the extent that they allowed
evidence of this type to be introduced at trial. Id.
42. Another recent Georgia Supreme Court decision, State v. Turnquest, 305 Ga. 758,
827 S.E.2d 865 (2019), decided just after Elliott, confronted the issue of whether the
Georgia Constitution’s protection against self-incrimination requires law enforcement to
warn suspects in custody of their right to refuse to perform a breath test. The court
analyzed both the 1887 Georgia Constitution provision and the subsequent legal
developments involving the constitutional requirement that law enforcement inform
suspects of their constitutional rights. The court’s analysis was identical to its procedure
in Elliott in that sense. The court held that law enforcement officers are not required to
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In Keith v. State,43 the Georgia Court of Appeals cited and quoted
word for word the contemporaneous decision of the Supreme Court of
the United States in South Dakota v. Neville:44 “The admission into
evidence of a defendant’s refusal to submit to a blood-alcohol test does
not offend the right against self-incrimination.”45 In Keenan v. State,46
the Georgia Supreme Court held that the legislature, through O.C.G.A.
§ 40-6-392(d) (the “implied consent”47 statute), had decreed explicitly
that evidence of a defendant’s refusal to take a blood test could be used
against them at trial.48 The court in essence avoided the constitutional
question by deferring to the legislature, a common judicial exercise.49 In
Klink v. State,50 later overruled by Elliott’s predecessor Olevik, the
Georgia Supreme Court mandated that “[i]t is clear that the Georgia
Constitution does not protect citizens from compelled blood testing or
from the use of the results of compelled blood testing at trial.” 51 Finally,
just last year, the Georgia Court of Appeals found no difference between
the admission of evidence of a defendant’s refusal to take a stateadministered chemical test and the refusal to take an “Alco-sensor”52
preliminary breath test, stating that either are admissible at trial. 53

inform suspects of these rights before undertaking a breath test. Id. at 762–69, 827 S.E.2d
at 870–74.
43. 173 Ga. App. 462, 326 S.E.2d 826 (1985).
44. 459 U.S. 553 (1983).
45. Keith, 173 Ga. App. at 462, 326 S.E.2d at 827 (internal punctuation omitted).
46. 263 Ga. 569, 436 S.E.2d 475 (1993).
47. Implied Consent Law.
A statute establishing a presumption that the operator of a motor vehicle
implicitly consents to having a chemical test administered to determine blood
alcohol content, as long as the police have reason to believe that the person is
intoxicated or otherwise under the influence. When the operator is
unconscious, the police may rely on such a statute to justify taking a blood
sample without a court order.
Implied Consent Law, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).
48. Keenan, 263 Ga. at 571, 436 S.E.2d at 476.
49. Id. (stating “[t]he legislature grants the right and determines its nature.”).
50. 272 Ga. 605, 533 S.E.2d 92 (2000).
51. Id. at 606, 533 S.E.2d at 94 (citing Allen v. State, 254 Ga. 433, 434, 330 S.E.2d
588, 589 (1985)).
52. Alco-Sensor. “The tradename of a handheld device that police use as a
preliminary breath test to determine whether a driver has consumed alcohol.” AlcoSensor, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).
53. MacMaster v. State, 344 Ga. App. 222, 230, 809 S.E.2d 478, 485–86 (2018).
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The Supreme Court of the United States’ View

Scarcely four months after the Elliott decision, the Supreme Court of
the United States once again upheld, in Mitchell v. Wisconsin, that a
defendant’s refusal to submit to a blood test may be used against the
defendant in court without violating the Fifth Amendment. 54 The Court
was affirming its previous ruling on the matter in the seminal case
South Dakota v. Neville, decided over thirty years ago. The case
concerned the legal exploits of a Madison, South Dakota man who failed
to yield at a stop sign and was subsequently arrested when he exhibited
behaviors obviously indicative of drunkenness. 55 Mr. Neville
subsequently sought to suppress the evidence of his refusal to submit to
a blood test, and both the circuit and the Supreme Court of South
Dakota granted the motion.56 Since several other jurisdictions had
found no Fifth Amendment violations in this type of situation while
others had reached the opposite conclusion, the Supreme Court granted
certiorari.57
The statute at question in Neville was very similar to the Georgia
implied consent statute ruled unconstitutional in Elliott. South Dakota
Code § 32-23-10.158 explicitly states that a suspect’s refusal to submit to
a blood-alcohol test “may be admissible into evidence at the trial.” 59 The
Supreme Court began its analysis by stating that “[m]ost courts
applying general Fifth Amendment principles to the refusal to take a
blood test have found no violation of the privilege against
self-incrimination.”60 The Court chose to base its decision by
determining whether the choice between submitting to a test or having
a refusal being used against a suspect in court was so “painful,
dangerous, or severe” that a suspect would prefer to confess, thereby

54. Mitchell, 139 S. Ct. at 2533.
55. Neville, 459 U.S. at 554–56. Neville stumbled and fell when he exited the vehicle,
informed the police that his license was suspended due to a previous DUI arrest, failed
several field sobriety tests, and upon being asked to take a blood alcohol test informed the
officers present “I’m too drunk, I won’t pass the test.” Id.
56. Id. at 553. Though the evidence was admissible at trial according to the South
Dakota statute, the South Dakota Supreme Court held the statute to be in violation of the
privilege against self-incrimination. Id.
57. Id. at 558.
58. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 32-23-10.1 (2019).
59. Id.; Neville, 459 U.S. at 556.
60. Neville, 459 U.S. at 560. The Supreme Court notably referred to, but ultimately
did not rest its decision on, Judge Traynor’s influential opinion in People v. Sudduth, 421
P.2d 393 (Cal. 1966), where the California Supreme Court held that a refusal of this sort
was a physical act and not a communication and was therefore not protected. Id. at 560–
61.
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producing unconstitutional coerced testimony.61 Determining that a
simple blood-alcohol test was “safe, painless, and commonplace” while
at the same time acknowledging that the choice may not be easy for a
suspect to make, the Court ultimately concluded that a refusal is not
protected by the self-incrimination protections of the Constitution. 62
The appellant then made a due process argument, stating that the
admission at trial of his refusal violated due process because, during his
confrontation with law enforcement, he had not been fully warned of
the consequences of a refusal. 63 The grounds of his argument were
rooted in Doyle v. Ohio,64 in which the Court ruled that the Due Process
Clause prohibited the state from using a defendant’s silence after
Miranda warnings to impeach his trial testimony. 65 The Court based its
reasoning in Doyle on the limited probative value of the evidence as well
the ironic unfairness of assuring a suspect that their his silence would
not be used against him, and then using his silence against him at trial
by impeaching his testimony.66 The Court distinguished the situation in
Doyle from the present case by describing the right to silence as
constitutional in nature while the right to refuse an alcohol test as a
boon granted by the South Dakota legislature. 67 Further, while the
right to remain silent contained a guarantee that no harm would come
of exercising the right, the South Dakota statute specifically stated that
to refuse would carry penalties such as the loss of a license, even though
the police did not mention an evidentiary penalty. 68 The Court
concluded its opinion by stating that the admission of refusal did not
violate due process, and thus solidified the judiciary’s typical approach
to this question for the next thirty plus years. 69
One of the courts influenced by the Supreme Court of the United
States’ decision was the Georgia Court of Appeals the same year. In
Wessels v. State,70 a Cobb county defendant convicted of DUI appealed
the decision of the trial court to deny his motion for a mistrial due to
the admission of evidence of his refusal to take an alcohol test, citing

61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.

Id. at 563 (referring to Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 765).
Neville, 459 U.S. at 564–65.
Id. at 564.
426 U.S. 610 (1976).
Id.
Neville, 459 U.S. at 565.
Id.
Id. at 565–66.
Id.
169 Ga. App. 246, 312 S.E.2d 361 (1980).
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the constitutional protection against self-incrimination.71 The court
began its analysis by immediately citing to the decision in Neville from
earlier in the year. Though the court agreed with the defendant “that
the
Georgia
Constitution
affords
more
protection
from
self-incrimination than does the United States Constitution,” the court
ultimately was persuaded by the Supreme Court.72 The court concluded
that where a suspect has been informed of his rights, a refusal to
submit to a test is not the product of coercion, but one of two options
provided by the state as a product of the informed consent statute,73
which at the time was O.C.G.A. § 40-5-55.74
Neville has also been cited positively by the Supreme Court of the
United States in two subsequent decisions within the last few years
regarding the admission of BAC test refusals. In Missouri v. McNeely,75
Justice Sotomayor cited to Neville and stated that “most States allow
the motorist’s refusal to take a BAC test to be used as evidence against
him in a subsequent criminal prosecution” in an effort to demonstrate
the wide variety of methods the states use to curtail drunk driving. 76 In
Birchfield v. North Dakota,77 the Court held a North Dakota statute
that criminally punished suspects for refusing to submit to a blood test
based on implied consent laws to be unconstitutional, while at the same
time stating that “[o]ur prior opinions have referred approvingly to the
general concept of implied-consent laws that impose civil penalties and
evidentiary consequences on motorists who refuse to comply.”78
C. The Other Eleventh Circuit States
1.

Florida

Like a lot of jurisdictions, Florida allows a suspect’s refusal to submit
to alcohol tests to be admitted in court by statute. Florida Statute
§ 316.193279 makes up the sunshine state’s extensive and broad implied
consent law, and the statute explicitly states “[t]he refusal to submit to
71. Id. at 246, 312 S.E.2d at 361–62.
72. Id. at 246–47, 312 S.E.2d at 362.
73. Id. at 247, 312 S.E.2d at 362.
74. O.C.G.A. § 40-5-55 (2019).
75. 569 U.S. 141 (2013).
76. Id. at 161.
77. 136 S. Ct. 2160 (2016).
78. Id. at 2185 (stating in reference to these types of laws: “Petitioners do not
question the constitutionality of those laws, and nothing we say here should be read to
cast doubt on them.”).
79. FLA. STAT. § 316.1932 (2019).
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a chemical or physical breath test upon the request of a law
enforcement officer . . . is admissible into evidence in any criminal
proceeding.”80 Despite the statute, the Florida Supreme Court has
previously addressed the issue in the context of constitutional
protections against self-incrimination.81 In State v. Taylor,82 the
defendant was arrested for DUI in St. Petersburg and moved to
suppress the evidence of his refusal to submit to sobriety tests at trial. 83
On appeal, the Supreme Court of Florida applied and cited to the same
rationale used by the Supreme Court of the United States in Neville,
and stated that the use of this evidence at trial did not violate either
the federal or state constitutions. 84
2.

Alabama

Alabama, like its fellow Eleventh Circuit sisters Georgia and Florida,
sought to deal with the problem of drunk drivers and evidentiary issues
arising from police stops by passing an implied consent statute.
Alabama Code § 32-5-19285 imposes a ninety-day suspension of a
suspect’s driver’s license if the suspect refuses to take an alcohol test,
and the yellowhammer state went even further by also designating
anyone found “dead, unconscious or . . . otherwise in a condition
rendering him incapable of refusal, shall be deemed not to have
withdrawn the consent.”86 The statute does not explicitly mention
whether evidence of a defendant’s refusal is admissible at the
statutorily created hearing concerning the suspension of a suspect’s
license, but in Hill v. State87 the Alabama Supreme Court addressed the
issue.88 The Georgia Supreme Court referenced Hill in Elliott, where
the Georgia bench declined to follow its sister jurisdiction in a rather
condescending manner, stating: “the decisions of sister states cannot
change the meaning of a preexisting provision of the Georgia
Constitution . . . [the Hill Court] that altered course did so without any
meaningful analysis.”89

80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.

FLA. STAT. § 316.1932(1)(a)(1)(a) (2019).
See, e.g., State v. Taylor, 648 So. 2d 701 (Fla. 1995).
648 So. 2d 701 (Fla. 1995).
Id. at 703.
Id. at 704; FLA. CONST. art. 1, § 9.
ALA. CODE § 32-5-192 (2019).
ALA. CODE § 32-5-192(b) (2019).
366 So. 2d 318 (1979).
Id. at 320.
Elliott, 305 Ga. at 201, 824 S.E.2d at 281.
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While the Alabama Supreme Court did struggle with this question, it
would be careless to label its analysis meaningless. Like its fellow
members of the Eleventh Circuit, Alabama’s state constitution provides
that a criminal defendant “shall not be compelled to give evidence
against himself.”90 In Hill, the court needed to determine whether the
difference in wording in the Alabama constitution and the United
States Constitution sections dealing with self-incrimination meant the
Alabama protections were broader. The Alabama constitution protects
against all, in general, “evidence” while the United States Constitution
only protects against self “testimony.”91 This question of semantics, as
previously stated, was addressed by the Supreme Court of the United
States in Schmerber, where the Court distinguished between the
compulsion of communications and testimony and the compulsion of
acts which lead to real, physical evidence.92 Justice Brennan, writing
the majority for a split court, concluded the scope of the privilege did
not extend to those coerced acts that produce real evidence in the
defendant Schmerber’s case, blood.93 In Hill, the Alabama Supreme
Court noted this difference in wording, but, relying on its previous
ruling in Hubbard v. State,94 in which the court concluded that the two
Constitutions would be interpreted synonymously in this area,
ultimately concluded that Schmerber controlled and the evidence was
admitted.95
D. The Other Federal Courts of Appeal
The United States Courts of Appeal have rarely addressed this area
of criminal evidence law, given the Supreme Court’s ruling on the
matter in Neville, and the United States Court of Appeals for the
Eleventh Circuit has yet to address the issue. Unsurprisingly, the vast
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit addressed the
issue in the context of the Fifth Amendment to the United States
Constitution in a rare appeal from the District Court of Alaska.96 In
Deering v. Brown,97 an Alaska state trooper arrested defendant Deering
for DUI. When he refused to take a breathalyzer, he was charged not
only for driving while intoxicated (DWI) but also for the separate
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.

ALA. CONST. art. 1, § 7.
Hill, 366 So. 2d at 321–22.
Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 761.
Id.
215 So. 2d 261 (Ala. 1968).
Hill, 366 So. 2d at 322; Hubbard, 215 So. 2d at 266.
See Deering v. Brown, 839 F.2d 539 (9th Cir. 1988).
839 F.2d 539 (9th Cir. 1988).
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criminal offense of refusing to take a breathalyzer test.98 Alaska
Statute § 28.35.032(g)99 makes such a refusal a criminal misdemeanor
with a minimum punishment of three days in jail, the implementation
of an ignition-interlock device100 for six months, and a fine for $1500. 101
In a question of first impression for all of the federal circuit courts, the
Ninth Circuit examined whether the Neville rationale could be applied
to a statute that imposed criminal penalties rather than civil. 102 This
was a novel question, as at the time, only Alaska and New York
imposed criminal penalties for refusing to take a breathalyzer. 103
On appeal, Deering attempted to convince the court that the effect of
Alaska criminalizing refusals to submit to breathalyzer tests was to
convert the evidence from non-testimonial to communicative or
testimonial under the Schmerber and Neville line of analysis.104
Essentially, Deering’s argument was that refusing to submit to a breath
test in ordinary circumstances amounted to mere evidence of
impropriety. On the other hand, where a refusal to submit amounted to
a criminal violation, the suspect would be coerced into choosing either
to take the test or “outright confess[] . . . guilt”105 The Ninth Circuit,
while stating that Deering’s argument was “appealing at first blush,”
ultimately concluded the conversion of the refusal from evidence to an
element of a crime did not transform the right itself. 106 The court
likened the Alaska statute to criminal contempt laws for violating court
orders to produce physical evidence, a situation where the court
previously had ruled that no constitutional right to refuse the order
existed.107 The court also found that the refusal was not “compelled”
although it did “acknowledge that the choice in this case appears more
coercive than that in Neville.”108
98. Id. at 541.
99. ALASKA STAT. § 28.35.032(g) (2019).
100. Ignition-interlock device:
A device installed in a motor vehicle to determine the driver’s blood alcohol
content before the vehicle can be started and to prevent its being started if the
blood alcohol level registers as being above the acceptable limit. In some
jurisdictions, those convicted of DWI must bear the expense of installing such a
device as a condition of being able to have a driver’s license.
Ignition-interlock device, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).
101. ALASKA STAT. § 28.35.032(g)(A) (2019).
102. Deering, 839 F.2d at 540.
103. Id. at 540 n.2.
104. Id. at 541.
105. Id. at 541–42.
106. Id. at 542.
107. Id. (citing In re Braughton, 520 F.2d 765, 767 (9th Cir. 1975)).
108. Deering, 839 F.2d at 542–43.
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The only other Circuit to address this issue happens to be the only
other Circuit that Georgia courts may view as less persuasive than the
Ninth Circuit: the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit covering the states of New York, Vermont, and Connecticut. In
Welch v. District Court of Vermont,109 the defendant was convicted in a
Vermont state court of DUI and, pursuant to Title 23 of the Vermont
Statutes Annotated § 1205,110 at trial the prosecution admitted evidence
of the defendant’s refusal to submit to a breathalyzer test over Welch’s
objection.111 The issue on appeal was whether the defendant’s refusal to
furnish his “breath” constituted testimonial evidence under Schmerber
as distinguished from the actual real evidence (the “breath” in and of
itself) which the defendant accepted as physical evidence under
Schmerber.112
While not addressed directly, as the defense counsel had failed to
object at trial, in Schmerber, dicta in the majority opinion indicated the
prosecution “‘may have to forego the advantage of any Testimonial
products in administering the test.’”113 This was due to concerns that
suspects may reveal incriminating statements or speak confessions
brought about due to the possible dread suspects may face because of
the potential fear the test may be painful or due to religious
opposition.114 Here, the Second Circuit determined there was no
evidence that Welch refused because of anxiety or religious views;
indeed, the record showed that he never gave the police a reason for his
refusal.115 Welch, in the alternative, contended that Vermont’s
statutorily-created right to refuse to take a chemical test distinguished
his case from prior cases where this type of evidence was admitted
because a refusal would punish him for simply exercising his rights
under the law.116 The Court also dismissed this argument stating that
the right to refuse was reciprocal to the statute allowing the evidence to
be admitted at trial, and holding that Welch could not contend he was
surprised his right to refuse was qualified. 117

109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.

594 F.2d 903 (2d. Cir. 1979).
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, § 1205 (2019).
Welch, 594 F.2d at 903.
Id. at 904.
Id. at 904 (quoting Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 765 n.9).
Id. at 904.
Id.
Id. at 904–05.
Id. at 905.
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E. Other Southern States
In terms of jurisdictions that may be more persuasive to Georgia
courts than the Ninth and Second Circuits (i.e. those well below the
Mason-Dixon Line) the Supreme Court of Mississippi followed the
decision in Neville in Ricks v. State,118 concluding that evidence of a
suspect’s refusal to take a breath test did not violate the Fifth
Amendment, Art. 3, § 26 of the Mississippi Constitution of 1890, 119 and
Mississippi Rule of Evidence 402,120 finding no reason to interpret the
scope of the Mississippi Constitution more broadly in this area. 121
Similarly, South Carolina’s implied consent statute § 56-5-2950122
allows a person’s refusal to be used against the person in court and it
has never been overturned by the palmetto state’s higher courts. 123
Finally, Tennessee does not explicitly state in its implied consent
statute that this type of evidence is admissible, but the courts of
Tennessee have consistently ruled that this type of evidence will be
allowed.124 In State v. Wright,125 the Tennessee Court of Criminal
Appeals followed the Supreme Court’s decision in Neville and declared
that the courts of the state had “laid to rest this issue.”126
IV. ANALYSIS
A. The Scourge of Drunk Driving, Statistics, and Public Policy
Concerns
The pestilence of drunk driving has galvanized the public and policy
leaders in this country for decades, especially in the last twenty years
or so. Indeed, many nonprofit organizations and charities formed solely
to combat drunk driving have become household names, such as
Mothers Against Drunk Driving (MADD) and the Governor’s Highway
Safety Association (GHSA). The public is constantly assaulted with
billboards, television commercials, and public service announcements

118. 611 So. 2d 212 (Miss. 1992).
119. MISS. CONST. art. 3, § 26.
120. M.R.E. Rule 402 (2019). This rule states all relevant evidence is admissible in
Mississippi unless it is prohibited by the federal and state constitution or the Mississippi
Rules of Evidence. Id.
121. Ricks, 611 So. 2d at 214–16.
122. S.C. CODE ANN. § 56-5-2950 (2019).
123. S.C. CODE ANN. § 56-5-2950(B)(1) (2019).
124. See State v. Wright, 691 S.W.2d 564, 565–66 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1984); State v.
Smith, 681 S.W.2d 569, 570 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1984).
125. 691 S.W.2d 564 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1984).
126. Wright, 691 S.W.2d at 566.
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decrying the evils of drunk driving in a manner comparable to the
height of the war on drugs in the eighties and early nineties, in which
the entire entertainment industry, from arcades to Saturday morning
cartoons, implored a generation of children to say no to drugs. The
reasons for these measures is the hard fact that every day in the United
States, on average thirty people die in drunk driving crashes, about one
person every forty eight minutes in 2017, according to the National
Highway Traffic Safety Association. 127 Due to the strict enforcement of
drunk driving laws, this number has dropped by a third in the past
three decades; however, drunk driving accidents still claim more than
10,000 lives per year in the United States. 128 According to the most
recent year for which available data exists, the death and damages from
these accidents cost 44 billion dollars in 2010. 129
The most common alcohol-related crime in the United States is still
driving under the influence, despite stricter laws, and on average
around 10,000 people every year are involved in road collisions due to
the influence of alcohol.130 An additional 1.4 million are arrested for
driving while drunk.131 According to the National Highway Traffic
Safety Administration, in 2017, 10,874 people were killed in an alcoholimpaired driving incident, which again results in an average of about
thirty fatalities per day.132 And in Georgia, statistics by the Governor’s
Office of Highway Safety reported that 24–25% of all crash fatalities
involved some level of alcohol impairment between 2012 and 2016 and
that an average of 319 people per year died because of alcohol related
crashes during this five-year period.133 These statistics show that drunk
driving is clearly something both the federal and state governments
should feel compelled to address.
In response to these numbers, every state legislature in the Union
has passed some type of implied consent statute and increased the

127. Drunk Driving: Overview, NATIONAL HIGHWAY SAFETY TRAFFIC SAFETY
ADMINISTRATION, https://www.nhtsa.gov/risky-driving/drunk-driving (last visited Nov. 15,
2019).
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Obodeze, supra note 1.
131. DUI
Statistics,
BACTRACK.COM,
https://www.bactrack.com/blogs/expertcenter/35040645-dui-statistics (last visited Oct 28, 2019). “Unfortunately, that
astonishing figure represents just 1% of the 112 million adults in the U.S. who self-report
episodes of alcohol-impaired driving each year.” Id.
132. Quick Facts 2017, NATIONAL HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMINISTRATION, (July
2019) https://crashstats.nhtsa.dot.gov/Api/Public/ViewPublication/812747.
133. Alcohol Statistics, GOVERNOR’S OFFICE OF HIGHWAY SAFETY IN GEORGIA,
https://www.gahighwaysafety.org/research/alcohol-statistics/ (last visited Oct 28, 2019).
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harshness of their intoxicated driving penalties in order to deter this
type of behavior. On the whole, these measures can be viewed as
successful to an extent given the drop in fatalities over the past couple
of decades and the social stigma now associated with drinking and
driving that did not exist with previous generations. However, in the
rush to combat drunk driving, as with any crisis, it is important to step
back and properly acknowledge and safeguard the constitutional
protections guaranteed to every citizen. Society must balance the
interests of combating drunk driving with the constitutional protections
against self-incrimination, unreasonable searches and seizures,
overbroad statutes, and equal treatment under the law.
There is no societal benefit to drunk driving, and given the fact that
the country has long struggled with the question of alcohol in our
society, as both the Eighteenth134 and Twenty-First Amendment135 can
attest to, the constitutional protections associated with the prosecution
of drunk drivers seem less important than other criminal proceedings
and fundamental rights in general. This line of thinking ignores the
bare facts of the matter; the total economic impact of the beer, wine,
and spirits retail industry in the United States is estimated to total
$363.33 billion annually, a figure which represents 1.65 percent of the
U.S. economy based on total gross domestic product. 136
Americans enjoy their intoxicating liquids. According to the 2017
National Survey on Drug Use and Health (NSDUH), 86.3 percent of
people ages 18 or older reported that they drank alcohol at some point
in their lifetime; 70.1 percent reported that they drank in the past year;
55.9 percent reported that they drank in the past month. 137 Alcohol is a
blatant fact of society that the country has tried and failed to prohibit in
the past. A balance then must be struck between battling the evils of
drunk driving and upholding the constitutional protections of those so
convicted in a society where alcohol is so prevalent. An essential
component of this balance is the need for clarity, uniformity, and
unambiguity with regards to the laws surrounding this issue. The
134. U.S. CONST. amend. XVIII (repealed 1933). The Eighteenth Amendment
established the prohibition of “intoxicating liquors.” Id.
135. U.S. CONST. amend. XXI. The Twenty-First Amendment repealed Prohibition,
and remains the only amendment that repealed a prior Amendment. Id.
136. AMERICAN BEVERAGE LICENSEES, America’s Beer, Wine & Spirits Retailers Create
2.03 Million Jobs & $122.63 Billion in Direct Economic Impact, (Oct. 23, 2018),
https://www.ablusa.org/americas-beer-wine-spirits-retailers-create-2-03-million-jobs-12263-billion-in-direct-economic-impact/.
137. Alcohol Facts and Statistics, NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF ALCOHOL ABUSE AND
ALCOHOLISM, https://www.niaaa.nih.gov/alcohol-facts-and-statistics (last visited Oct. 28,
2019)
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recent decision in Elliott by the Georgia Supreme Court does not
achieve any of these objectives.
B.

The Georgia Supreme Court Opens Pandora’s Box

To use the Georgia Supreme Court’s own words in Justice Boggs’s
concurrence, “statements in the implied consent notices . . . are likely to
become problematic in future cases as a result of Olevik or the Court’s
decision today.”138 In effect, the court completely called into question
the entirety of the implied consent statute, and prosecutors and police
were left wondering how to reconcile the new caselaw with established
practices. The statutorily mandated implied consent notice before
Elliott used to require officers to state that a refusal to submit to a
breath test may be offered into evidence at trial. After Elliott, this
statement was called into question, as was any consent to a breath test
since the then-current implied consent warning contains language that
Elliott had found to be unconstitutional. Officers and State prosecutors
were left in a bind; should they omit this version of the notice? If a wellmeaning officer did omit this part of the notice requirement, would it be
proper for a lawyer to argue that this omission violates the statute, and
to argue that his client’s subsequent punishment or arrest was
procedurally flawed? The law does require officers to read the warnings
in a “substantively accurate” form.139 Or was the statement merely
perfunctory until the General Assembly changed what the officers are
required to read?
Fortunately, the Georgia General Assembly took notice. As a result of
the decision in Elliott, the Assembly quickly amended the implied
consent statute to say a refusal to “submit to blood or urine testing”
could be used against them at trial.140 Of course this new provision
138. Elliott, 305 Ga. at 224, 824 S.E.2d at 296–97 (Boggs, J., concurring).
139. See Sauls, 293 Ga. at 167–68, 744 S.E.2d at 737.
140. O.C.G.A. § 40-5-67.1(2) (2019). The new implied consent notice for suspects
twenty-one years or older reads in its entirety:
The State of Georgia has conditioned your privilege to drive upon the highways
of this state upon your submission to state administered chemical tests of your
blood, breath, urine, or other bodily substances for the purpose of determining
if you are under the influence of alcohol or drugs. If you refuse this testing,
your Georgia driver’s license or privilege to drive on the highways of this state
will be suspended for a minimum period of one year. Your refusal to submit to
blood or urine testing may be offered into evidence against you at trial. If you
submit to testing and the results indicate an alcohol concentration of 0.08
grams or more, your Georgia driver’s license or privilege to drive on the
highways of this state may be suspended for a minimum period of one
year. After first submitting to the requested state tests, you are entitled to
additional chemical tests of your blood, breath, urine, or other bodily
substances at your own expense and from qualified personnel of your own
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opened up its own set of confusing questions. For instance, does this
mean that law enforcement should now request a test of a suspect’s
blood or urine at the scene? The implied consent statute makes it clear
that a test should be administered as soon as possible. Should officers
now assume that they should carry syringes, blood bags, and
urine-testing kits instead of a relatively simple breathalyzer if the state
would like to admit evidence of a refusal?
Drawing a distinction between protecting a person’s “breath,” based
on the fact that a person self-incriminates himself by blowing into a
machine and does not when the person is forced to give a urine sample
or is stuck with a needle, is substantively useless. Regardless of how the
sample is taken, the result is the same; a suspect is being forced to give
evidence of that person’s level of intoxication. If given a choice, most
people would choose to simply blow into a breathalyzer. Though the
Supreme Court in Olevik attempted to clarify that its distinction was
not being made between acts that result in “testimony” (i.e. evidence
that is spoken) and those that result in “physical evidence,” the end
result of the statute is the same as if the court had based its decision on
this perplexing distinction.141 Semantics aside, the proposition that a
person performs an incriminating act or gives testimony by breathing
seems far-fetched; in that case, everyone is giving testimony every
second of every day. Indeed, regardless of labels, what the citizenry and
officials of Georgia have been left with is the requirement of a much
more invasive and nonsensical test.
From law enforcement’s perspective, having to acquire a blood or
urine sample from a potential perpetrator is a much more complicated,
bothersome, lengthy, and tricky process than giving a breath test. Many
registered nurses and doctors have trouble drawing blood from people
due to the differences in every person’s circulatory system, and entire
businesses are organized around the delicate and invasive process of
taking urine samples. It would be preposterous to expect untrained
police to perform these types of procedures, especially in the middle of a
road block or along the side of a busy highway. This would mean that
an officer would be forced to apprehend a suspect and transport him to
a place where a professional could take the sample, such as the county
jail. Arresting someone is a lot more dangerous and testier than simply
requesting a breath test that can easily be performed at the scene.
choosing. Will you submit to the state administered chemical tests of your
(designate which test)?
Id.
141. The new statute explicitly omits breath tests and instead states that “[y]our
refusal to submit to blood or urine testing may be offered into evidence against you at
trial.” O.C.G.A. § 40-5-67.1.
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Indeed, many drivers suspected of drinking will simply request a breath
test to expedite the process.
Also, time becomes a factor in these situations, given that people
eventually sober up. A person over the limit when apprehended may
well drop below the illegal limit by the time the officer manages to
transport him to a place where he may be tested. Given that the test
has to be administered as soon as possible, does this mean that police
strolling for impaired drivers need to carry along a professional who can
perform the invasive and embarrassing test on the side of a public road?
Or should the state spend valuable tax money to train police so that
they can perform blood and urine tests? Of course not. The invention of
the breathalyzer takes care of all these problems. But if the suspect
refuses to take the breath test and the police would like admit the
suspects BAC at the time of the arrest into evidence for a criminal trial,
under Elliott the police would have to turn to these less efficient
methods. Seeing as the most important piece of evidence to a trier of
fact in a DUI case is the suspect’s BAC, it is easy to see how this
hypothetical could arise.
From the alleged wrongdoer’s perspective, the process of giving blood
or urine samples is much more meddlesome than breath tests. The
drawing of blood requires the use of a needle and may result in the
sight of one’s own blood, two of the most common and infamous phobias
in society. Indeed, as the American Red Cross can attest to, it is hard to
get people to donate blood for good causes, let alone to be pricked and
forced to give blood to be used as evidence against them. Due to these
hardships and burdens, most jurisdictions have ruled that warrantless
blood searches violate a person’s constitutional rights absent some
exigent circumstances.142 It is also not hard to see why someone would
be unwilling to give a urine sample, given privacy and practicality
concerns associated with such a test. But consider the situation of a
sober driver who is suspected of driving drunk and an officer who would
like to admit the results of the alcohol test into trial. The suspect must
either give up his license or submit to an invasive test according to the
new statute. This situation is ripe for appellate review and further
confusion. If the Georgia Supreme Court would hold a breath test to be
an unconstitutionally compelled incriminating act then surely a
warrantless blood or urine test also would be held as unconstitutional
given that the procedures are much more taxing.
So logically, it seems counterintuitive that a person’s refusal to take
a much more invasive test may be used against that person at trial,
while a refusal to take a much easier test could not be used against the
142. See Mitchell, 139 S. Ct. at 2531.
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person at trial. There may be very good reasons why someone would
refuse to take a blood test or urine test other than concealing
drunkenness. Many people suffer from blood disorders that may affect
their ability to give blood such as anemia or hemophilia. Some suspects
may simply fear needles and blood or, understandably, have problems
being forced to provide a sample of bodily fluids. Also, imagine if a
suspect were to, understandably, request a breath test as an alternative
to a blood or urine test; would the results of that test be admissible at
trial? Would this situation result in a test that was voluntary or
coerced? The confusion surrounding this new statute that came about
as a result of Elliott may take years to untangle.
C. Constitutional Protections Granted in Elliott are Fundamentally
Toothless and Must Give Way to Overwhelming State Interests
As Justice Boggs in his concurrence attempted to clarify, some key
components of the consent law were not affected by the Elliott decision.
The main component unaffected was the provision setting up the
administrative scheme in which a suspect’s license can be suspended if
the suspect refuses to submit to chemical testing. The concurrence also
emphasized that the restriction only applied to criminal proceedings
and not administrative proceedings, including the license suspension
scheme found in the statute. These limitations, coupled with the
General Assembly’s rewording of the implied consent statute
afterwards, leads to the conclusion that in practical terms, the Georgia
citizenry’s experience with DUI laws and police are unlikely to change
fundamentally. The new implied consent law handed down by the
legislature represents a rewording of semantics in order to preserve the
status quo and avoid any long-term ramifications that may result from
the Elliott decision.
It is clear throughout the Olevik and Elliott decisions that the
Georgia Supreme Court went through an extensive and thorough
analysis of the history of self-incrimination in Georgia in order to reach
the conclusion that it did. It is not the purpose of this Comment to
analyze the court’s statutory and constitutional interpretation methods.
The court’s analysis of the admission of this type of evidence led to a
conclusion that is different from every other jurisdiction. However, it
ultimately based its decision on the greater protections granted by
Georgia Constitution, which binds no other jurisdiction. Constitutional
protections form the backbone of our civilization and should not be
limited without overwhelming need. However, constitutional
protections must sometimes be limited in the face of compelling
governmental interest, especially when those interests substantially
outweigh the right asserted.
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Forcing a person to take a breath test, or upon refusal suspending
the person’s license and admitting the refusal into evidence, does not
represent a choice between two such taxing and oppressive mandates as
to render it unconstitutionally coercive. Any reasonable driver can see
the reasons behind, and not object to, a simple and effortless breath test
in order to prove his soberness. However, it is clear why an intoxicated
driver would object, if the test registers an illegal limit the test
functions as an almost certain admission of guilt.143 As demonstrated,
the carnage inflicted on the country by drunk drivers represents a
compelling reason for the government to slightly diminish the right
against self-incrimination in cases involving drunk driving. This
conclusion can be reached without wading into the morass of the
differences between testimony and physical evidence. Every state in the
Union passed some type of an implied consent statute in order to
combat drunk driving. The reasons behind implied consent laws have
not diminished in the decades since they were first implemented.
Alcohol and automobiles remain prevalent realities in society, and as
long they remain, the need for straightforward and uncomplicated
implied consent laws remain. Indeed, the Georgia General Assembly
quickly updated the implied consent law in order to lessen confusion in
this area, a minor miracle given the partisanship of modern politics.
V. CONCLUSION
Drunk driving remains a serious and costly issue in the present day.
In order to address the problem of drunk driving, Georgia, like every
other state, passed an implied consent law. The law stated that a driver
in Georgia impliedly consents to a blood alcohol test when operating a
motor vehicle, and also that a refusal could be used against them at
trial. The Georgia Supreme Court in Elliott ruled that evidence of a
breath test refusal could not be admitted against the defendant in a
criminal trial as this violated the state constitution’s mandate against
self-incrimination. In response, the Georgia general assembly revised
the implied consent law so that only the refusal of a blood or urine test
could be used against them. This has resulted in a situation where a
harmless and unobtrusive breath test has been disfavored and more
invasive tests seem to be embraced. The constitutional rights the court
upheld so zealously will have little impact on the actual conviction and
sentencing of DUI suspects, given the subsequent rewording of the
143. But see Stacy Cowley & Jessica Silver-Greenberg, These Machines Can Put You in
Jail.
Don’t
Trust
Them,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Nov.
3,
2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/11/03/business/drunk-drivingbreathalyzer.html?smid=nytcore-ios-share.
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statute, the fact that the license suspension scheme remains intact, and
the fact that the refusal of a breath test can still be admitted in an
administrative proceeding. In its noble effort to uphold Georgia’s
citizens right against self-incrimination, the Georgia Supreme Court
only set about a chain reaction that resulted in a situation of confusion
and impracticability, all in the name of expanding a constitutional right
which Georgia’s citizens will not feel the effects of.

Brian Fussell, Jr.

